701 TA session 2

Midterm Question about revealed preference

Say the original price and consumption bundle is

(1)p0=[112], x=[5199]

, and another price and consumption bundle

(2)p1=[111], x1=[121212]

, and the third price and consumption bundle,

(3)p2=[121], x2=[27111]

Check for the WARP

WARP implies that for any x and y, if pxxpyy, then pyy<pyx.

(4)p1x1=36>p1x0=33

, which implies that x0 is affordable under price level p1, bundle 1 is WARP to bundle 0.

 

SARP and WARP

with budget balance and WARP, for 2 good cases WARP is equivalent to SARP.

 

Mean variance representation

(SS Page 406-408)

(5)rf(r)
(6)E(u(r))=u(r)f(r)dr

When the utility function is CARA, i.e. u=exp(ax), and

(7)f(r)=12πσexp((rμ)22σ2)

Then E(u(r)) only depends on μ and σ2.

Proof:

(8)E(u(r))=earf(r)dr=ear12πσexp((rμ)22σ2)dr=12πσexp(12(rμ)22arσ2σ2)dr=12πσexp((rμ+aσ2)22σ2)dr×exp(μ2(μaσ2)22σ2)=exp(μa+σ2a22)

Therefore, the expected utility for a CARA function is a linear combination of mean and variance (after a monotonic transformation).

 

Variance 11.6?

General utility function U(R)

R is a random variable.

(9)R/rN(μ,σ2)=f(r)

(1) Show that E(U(R)) only depends on μ and σ2

Proof:

(10)E[U(R)]=u(r)f(r)dr=Φ(μ,σ2)

(2) Show that Φμ>0, and Φμ<0.

(11)Φμ=μu(r)f(r)dr

Since we can do normalization (transformation) first to make f(r) Simpler by utilizing z=Rμσ, then R=σZ+μ.

Hence,

(12)Φ(μ,σ2)=u(r)f(r)dr=u(r)12πσexp((rμ)22σ2)dr=u(σz+μ)12πexp(z22)dz

Therefore,

(13)Φμ=u(σz+μ)12πexp(z22)dz>0

and, because we cannot determine the sign of z, so it is not straightforward to determine the sign of Φσ2.

(14)Φσ2=u(σz+μ)z2σ212πexp(z22)dz=12π12σu(σz+μ)zexp(z22)dz=12π12σ[0u(σz+μ)zexp(z22)dz+0u(σz+μ)zexp(z22)dz]=12π12σ[0u(σz+μ)zexp(z22)d(z)+0u(σz+μ)zexp(z22)dz]

Combine them together,

(15)[0(u(σz+μ)u(μσz))zexp(z22)dz]

 

Another question

Assume we have two R, R1 and R2, they are i.i.d.

If a person is risk averse, she will devide her wealth between both assets.

If a persone is risk loving, she will invest all the walth on one asset.

Suppose this agent will devide share of α into R1 and (1α) into R2.

The maximization of expected utility function is,

(16)maxαu(αr1+(1α)r2)f(r1)f(r2)dr1dr2

FOCs:

(17)u(αr1+(1α)r2)(r1r2)f(r1)f(r2)dr1dr2=0

, which is equivalent to

(18)r1>r2u(αr1+(1α)r2)(r1r2)f(r1)f(r2)dr1dr2+r2>r1u(αr1+(1α)r2)(r1r2)f(r1)f(r2)dr1dr2=u(r1r2)f(r1)f(r2)dr1dr2

Difference - firm theory and consumer theory

Producer TheoryConsumer Theory
Production function f(x1,,xn)=outputs.Utility function U(x1,,xn)=Utility
isoquant curveindifference curve
MRTS: MRTS=MP1MP2MRS: MRS=MU1MU2
cost minimization :
min pixi s.t. f(x1,,xn)y
it requires the cost function to be quasi-concave.
Expenditure minimization
Profit maximization
max π=pyc(y),
It requires the profit function to be concave.
Utility maximization
  
  

 

Elasticity of substitution

Elasticity measures changes in quantity in response to some other determinants.

 

SS 1.2

For a CES production function

(19)y=(α1x1ρ+α2x2ρ)1ρ

Calculate the elasciticity of substitution.

By defination, a elasticity of substitution is

(20)e=

Output Elasticity

ϵi(xi)=f(x)xixif(x)=dlogf(x)dlogx.

 

Elasticity of scale

ϵ(x)=dlogf(tx)dlogtt=1

And we can show that ϵ(x)=ϵi(x).

(21)ϵ(x)=df(tx)dttf(tx)t=1=ifi(tx)xi×tf(tx)t=1=ifi(x)xif(x)=iϵi(x)

Specifically, for production function f(x) that is homogeneous degree of k, we have ϵ=k.

This is because: by Eular theorem

(22)ϵ=fi(x)xif(x)=kf(x)f(x)=k

Therefore, for f(x) is h.d.k, if k>1 then it is IRS, k=1 CRS, and k<1 DRS.

 

SS 1.8

For homothetic f(x1,x2),

MRTS(x1,x2)=MRTS(tx1,tx2) for any t0. it is equivalent to MRTS is H.D.0.

As function f(x1,x2) is homothetic, by defination of homothetic functions, there exists another function g(x1,x2) such that g is H.D.1, f=U(g), where U is a monotonic transformation.

(23)MRTS=f1(x1,x2)f2(x1,x2)=Ug1(x1,x2)Ug2(x1,x2)=g1(x1,x2)g2(x1,x2)

And, MRTS(tx) is

(24)MRTS(tx)=g1(tx1,tx2)g2(tx1,tx2)

Since g(x) is homogeneous degree of 1, then g1(tx)=g1(x), then these two MRTS are equivalent. which means that MRTS is H.D.0.

 

HW7

JR3.28

A firm's technology possesses all the usual properties. It produces output using three inputs, with conditional input demands xi(w1,w2,w3,y),i=1,2,3. Some of the following observations are consistent with cost minimisation and some are not. If an observation is inconsistent, explain why. If it is consistent, give an example of a cost or production function that would produce such behaviour. (a) x2/w1>0 and x3/w1>0. (b) x2/w1>0 and x3/w1<0. (c) x1/y<0 and x2/y<0 and x3/y<0. (d) x1/y=0. (e) (x1/x2)/w3=0.

For ij, xij>0 implies net substitutes (which is represented by the hicksian demand, ) and ij,xiwj<0 indicates net complements.

For (a), A CES/ CD production function could be one nice example.

For (b), x2/w1>0 and x3/w1<0, which means x1 and x2 are substitutes, and x1 and x3 are (net) complements. One example could be

(25)f(x1,x2,x3)=x2min{x1,x3}

In this case,

(26)x2=yw1+w3w2x1=x3=yw2w1+w3

There is another good example for this statement is,

(27)f(x1,x2,x3)=min{x1,x2}+min{x1,x3}

For (c), inconsistent, as we assume the marginal production to be positive.

For (d), if we require x1y=0 for all w,y , then the firm will not use input x1, if for some w,y, Then we have one fixed input x1.

For(e), A perfect complement satisfies this statement.

(28)f(x1,x2,x3)=x3min{x1,x2}

Another example is cobb-douglus.

(29)f(x1,x2,x3)=x1αx2βx3γ

One conclusion that is important

Statement: The determinant of substitution matrix must be zero

(This result holds for both consumer theory and producer theory)

(30)σ=(e1,1e1,nen,1en,n)

This hold for both cost function and expenditure function.

Since we have hicksian third law, i.e. wjeij=0, for i

This means that

(31)(e1,1e1,nen,1en,n)(w1wn)=0N×1

This implies that in this substitution matrix, at least one element could be expressed as linear combination of others, then it is nonsingular, so the determinant of σ is 0.

 

JR 3.42 Recovering production function.

Recall how do we derive the utility function from a expenditure function?

Expenditure function -> Indirect utility function -> Utility function

BUT we do not have a indirect production function.

Question

We have seen that every Cobb-Douglas production function, y=Ax1αx21α, gives rise to a CobbDouglas cost function, c(w,y)=yAw1αw21α, and every CES production function, y=A(x1ρ+ x2ρ)1/ρ, gives rise to a CES cost function, c(w,y)=yA(w1r+w2r)1/r. For each pair of functions, show that the converse is also true. That is, starting with the respective cost functions, 'work backward' to the underlying production function and show that it is of the indicated form. Justify your approach.

Step1: We can use Sheppard's lemma.

Step2: Try to cancel out w and use x to replace y,

Since

(32)c(w,y)=yAw1αw21α

By sheppard lemma, x1=cw1, and same for x2.

(33)x1=αyA(w1w2)α1x2=(1α)yA(w1w2)α

We can use this two to derive w1 and w2 as functions of x1 and x2. Then we can recover the production function.

 

Another example we can try to recover the production function

c(w,y)=yA(w1r+w2r)1/r.

We are able to recover a CES production function like this: y=1A(x1ρ+x2ρ)1/ρ

 

Midterm 2021 Q2

[25] Suppose that a production function for a good is given by q=f(k,l)=k+l+2kl. This function belongs to a class of functions known as generalized Leontief (fixed proportions) production functions. (a) What type of returns to scale does this function exhibit? (b) Calculate marginal productivities and show that they are positive and diminishing. (c) Calculate marginal rate of technical substitution and show that isoquants have the usual convex shape. (d) Calculate the elasticity of substitution for this production function.

Here in this question, q is the output,v is the price of capital k and w is the price of labor l.

For (a),

 

Homothetic and homogeneous production function

Theorem 3.4 in J&R

  1. For homothetic production function, the cost function could be writen down in this way:

    (34)c(w,y)=h(y)c(w,1)cost when y=1

    And the input demand function could be written as,

    (35)x(w,y)=h(y)x(w,1)

    This actually refers to separability.

  2. For homogeneous production function with degree of k, the cost function could be written as,

    (36)c(w,y)=y1/kc(w,1)x(w,y)=y1/kx(w,1)

 

How do we understand Envelope theorem

  1. For unconstraint problem (Profit maximization)

    Consider f(x1,x2,,xn;a) as a production function. x is something that we choose (choice variable), and a is an expgeneous variable.

    then we have a profit function like this,

    (37)π=f(x1,x2,,xn;a)ixiwi

    To solve this maximization problem,

    FOC: πxi=0, and we can obtain the optimal input demand x(a)=x(p,w)

    If we substitute back this imput demand back to our production function, we can obtain the obtimal production function, which we regard as a value function.

    (38)y=f(x(a))

    The envelope theorem says that

    (39)ya=f(x,a)a

    This only make sense at the optimal condition.

    In this profit maxmization case, we can also apply it to the optimal profit function (It becomes our value function in this case).

    (40)π(p,w)=pf(x)wixi

    Then, we see that

    (41)πp=f(x)=yπwi=xi
  2. For unconstraint case, if we are doing cost minimization, what we actually do is like this,

    (42)max/minf(x1,,xn;a)s.t.g(x1,,xn;a)=0

    FOC: Lxi=fi+λgi=0

    Then,

    (43)ya=La

Comparative static analysis

step 1. Set up the optimization problem and write down the first order conditions.

Step 2. Differentiate with respect to the parameters that we are interested in, and we write the system of equations into a matrix form.

Step 3. Solve for the partial derivitives by using the Cramer's rule.